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Pretaoe 
The purpose of this monograph is to show the important 
part played by Theodore Roosevelt in bringing to a close the 
Russo-Japanese War which was culminated in the Treaty of 
Portsmouth of 1905. 
The most important letters concerning the making of 
peace were not sent through out State Department because 
of the need for secrecy, and, therefore, are not published 
in our Government Documents. These letters, which were sent 
direct or through our Ambassadors, were first made public 
in 1920 by Joseph Bucklin Bishop in his book "Theodore 
Roosevelt and His Times , Shown in His Letters." In 1925, 
Tyler Dennett published "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese 
War, Based Primarily Upon the Private Papers of Theodore 
Roosevelt," in which still more of these letters were made 
public. These two sources have been cited in a number of 
cases in this thesis because the material is not available 
in any other publications. 
I believe that Theodore Roosevelt more than anyone 
else was responsible for the making of this Treaty. By 
his diplomatic appeal and his influence on the Tsar and the 
Mikado, he was able to bring about a conciliation between 
Russia and Japan in the critical meeting of August 29, 1905, 
and so ended the peace conference successfully with the 
Portsmouth Treaty. 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my 
adviser, Dr. T. R. Reynolds, Professor of History and Read 
V 
of the History Department, for his helpful hints and 
constructive criticism; to other members or the History 
faculty for suggestions concerning this report; and to the 
Library Staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical 
College for their invaluable assistance in securing the 
material . 
To my wire, Lila Potts, who has helped me by typing 
this thesis, I am moat grateful. 
Glenn L. Potts 
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Chapter I 
A PREVIEW OF THE FAR EAST TO 1904 
The Treaty or Shimonosek1, ending the Chino-Japanese 
War, was signed April 17, 1895. One provision of this treaty 
l gave Japan possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula, but a 
triple intervention by Germany, France, and Russia forced her 
to return this important concession to China for a larger 
money indemnity. 2 
After China's defea t in this war, she 
lay a stranded whale, apparently dead, or dying, and 
the ehief powers of Europe ca.me, like fishermen after 
blubber, and took here a province and there a harbor, 
and were callous to the fact that their victim was not 
dead.3 
The chief powers or Europe, Germany, Russia, Great Britain , 
and France, did not wait for the Treaty to be signed before 
descending like vultures upon China., demanding leases on 
harbors and provinces with special commercial privileges 
including rights for building railroads and digging mines. 
They soon made agreements defining their spheres of influence 
in China. 4 
(l) John v. A. 'Ma.oMurray, Treaties~ Agreements !1..Y! And 
Concerning China 1894-1919, New York, 1921, I, 18- 19. 
(2) Paul Hibbert Clyde, A History of the Modern and Contem-
porary Far East, New York , 1937, PP • 303-06. 
(3) William Roscoe Thayer, The Life !U!Q. Letters .Qf John Hay: , 
new York, 1915, II , 240. 
(4) Payson J. Treat, The Far East, A Political and Diplomatic 
History:, New York, 1928, PP • 322 ff. 
A message on the Open Door policy in China was sent to Ber-
lin, London, and St. Petersburg by the United States Secretary 
of State, John Hay. In this note Hay asked these countries 
which had received territorial concessions, not to discriminate 
against other countries of the world by (1) charging higher har-
bor duties or railway rates against one country than another, 
(2) allowing the Chinese to collect the same rate of tariff from 
all countries at all ports except the free ports, (3) agreeing 
not to interfere with any treaty port or vested interest in 
China.5 Each of these countries agreed to these principles, 
some not so forcefully as others. All of them saw their advan-
tage in not maintaining the Open Door, yet they dared not 
openly oppose the doctrine which Hay had championed.6 
These and the other world powers had hardly become accus-
tomed to the Open Door in China before they were excited to a 
desire tor revenge against the Chinese because of the Boxer 
Rising.7 The Boxers, and organization which opposed foreigners 
in China, on-June 14, 1900,- attacked the foreign legations 
at Peking, 8 causing the death of many of the members of the 
(5) House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., Doc-
ument 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Messa'e of the 
President 1899, Washington,--ygo1-;--pp. 128 ff. !:tei:-t~first 
citation this and all doc.uments of this set will be designated 
as Foreign Relations for whatever year is referred to. 
(6) Thayer, .2£• .£.!.!., p. 243 
(7) Ibid., p. 244. 
(8) Ibid., p. 236. According to Treat, .2E.• cit., p. 347, 
within the legations were the representatr-ves of eleven nations: 
the Ministers of the United States, Great Br itain, Russia, 
France, Italy, Spain, the\Nether lands, Belgium, and Japan, 
and the charges of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and nationals 
of three others--Swiss, Portuguese, and China. 
3 
legations . The others were saved by troops from the United 
States and European countries. Germany wa.s strongest in her 
demands for vengeance, and sent Count Waldersee with an army 
to punish the Chinese. 
Following this uprising Hay played a diplomatic game of 
bluff and ~uceeeded in making an agreea ble settlement between 
' 9 China and the other powers. By the agreement signed September 
?, 1901, China agreed to chastise the Boxers, pay indemnities, 
both public and private for losses associated with ,the insur-
rection, and to improve trade relations with all foreign 
nations. 10 
After this understanding all nations except Russia with-
drew their forces from China. Russia kept pressing the Chinese 
government for further concessions. These Russian demands for 
special interests in China caused Japan no little trepidation.11 
Japan a.nd England, both wanting to stop Russia's activity 
in China, signed the Anglo- Japanese alliance January 30, 1902. 
England agreed not to permit a third power to intervene on the 
side of Japan 's opponent, who was understood to be Russia. 12 
This new alliance caused Russia temporarily to reverse 
her plans by agreeing on April 8 to evacuate Manchuria and to 
( 9) House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 2d Sess., Doc-
ument 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Messa ge of the 
President 1900, Washington, 1902 , pp. 77 ff. 
(10) Ma.c.1urray, .Q.£• cit., p. 267. 
(11) Henry Chung, The Oriental Policy of the United States , 
New York, 1919 , p . 567 
(12) Alfred L. P. Dennis,~ Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
Berkeley, 1923, PP• l ff. 
4 
recognize China's sovereignty there.13 Russia began mili-
tary evacuation but maintained a strong railway guard to 
protect her commercial interests,14 including the Yalu Lum-
ber Company , which held a lumber concession granted to a 
Vladivostok merchant by the king of Korea. 15 The Tsar and 
several other government officials were financially interested 
in this company. They used this apparently innocent conces-
sion to create fortified posts along the railway. 16 When 
Russia stopped her military evacuation it became obvious 
that she wanted war with Japan. 17 
If Wianohuria and Korea had been a wilderness there would 
have been no clash of ambitions. This conflict of interests 
brought about diplomatic correspondence regarding their 
rights in China.. 18 
Japan, in August, 1903, signified her willingness to en-
ter negotiations with regard to Russia's interests in the Far 
East. 19 Japan offerect as a basis for negotiations the 
{ 13) House of Representati ve.s, 57th Congress, 2d Sees., 
Document 1, Foreign Relations with the Annual Message of 
the President 1902, Washington, 1903, PP• 280-81. 
(14) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese~, 
Garden City, 1925, PP• 129-30. · 
(15) Robert K. Douglass, Europe and!!!!.!'!:.!: East, New York, 
1928, P• 420. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Dennett, -2.E• cit., pp. 138-41. 
(18) Henry Fowler Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt~ Biographz, 
New York, 1931, p. 373 , 
(19) House of Representatives, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., 
Document 1, Foreign Relations ~ ~ Annual Message of ~ 
President~, Washington, 1904, p. 619. 
5 
following points: ( 1) defini ti-on o.f the interests of Japan 
in Korea and of' Russia. in Manchuria; (2) mutual agreement as 
to what measures ea.eh might take i .n protecting the defined 
interests; ( 3) mutual agreement to respect the· independence 
and territorial integrity of Ch1na and Ko,rea, and to maintain 
the principle of equal opportunity in both Empires tor the 
eommerce and industry of all nations. 20 
Russia's counter proposal was presented to Japan November 
3, 190;3. It was unsatisf'ac.tory to Japan in tha..t Russia wanted 
to regard Korea. only. Russia did not mention the terr'itorial 
integrity of China. or her interests in Manchuria., and refused 
to treat Manchuria. with .any country except China. herselt. 21 
The two countries continued to exchange notes, Russia 
answering Japan only after long delay and usually unsatis-
factorily. Russia finally wanted to make the discussion a 
pure and sim.ple Korean ,quea:ti.on. 22 
Japan returned Russia' :8 answer with a. request for re·eon-
.sidera.tion, signifying that she would not wait mol"e than a 
reasonable length of time ror a reply. War seemed very 
, . ·1t· 23 imminent unless Russia should recede .1.rom her pos . ion. 
Russia' s new reply embraced two points: ( l) 'She pro-
po s.ed to establish a neutral zone in Korean territory lying 
between the Korean and Manchurian f''rontier and the. thirty-
ninth parallel north latitude, (2) Japan should recognize 
120) l.J!!!1• 
(21) Ibid., PP• 610-20. 
(22) Ibid., P• 620. 
{23) Griscom to Hay, Ibi,d., p. 622. 
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that Ma.nohuria. wa.s outside her sphere of interest, and 
Rus5la. should not interfere with the privi1eges belonging to 
Japan and other nations under existing treaties with China, 
exclusive (}f' the establishment ot· foreign settlements.24 
Japan's answer ine.isted that they (l) dr-0p the point in 
regard to the· neutral zone in Korea; (2) modifl" the Ru.ssian 
proposal in regard to Manchuria in three ways,, ( a.) Japan woul.ti 
recognize that Ma.nohuria was outside her sphere of interest 
and Russia would respect the territor'ia.1 integrity of' China 
in Ma.nehuria, (b) Russia should not interfere with the rights 
of' any country in Ma.nohuri.a as made by treaties with China, 
( e) Ruasia. should. recognize that Korea wa.a outside her sphere 
of intereat. 25 
Mr. Doyd c. Griseom, the United States llinister to Japan, 
wrote to Mr. Hay February 5, 1904, saying that Japan thought 
she ha.d waited long enou.-gh tor a.n a.nawe:r: :from Russia., a.nd 
26 that Japan was preparing for war. · The f'ollowtng day, Mr. 
Grisoom wr0te Mr . Hay that Japan had terminated negotiations 
and broken of! diploma.t'ie rel.a. tions with Russia. 27 
Mr. Roberts. McCormick, the Uni.ted States Ambassador to 
Russia, in. wri t.ing to Jlr. Ray February 7, 1904,. e.aid that 
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent the Russian 
government' a reply t .o Japan. Mr. McCormick also said that 
(24) Grisoom to Hay, January a, 1904, HoufJe of Representatives, 
58th Congress, 3d Sess., Document 1, Foreign Rel$.tions with 
Jal!. Annual Message of~ Prepident 1904, Washington, 1905, 
P• 410. 
(25) Griscom to Hay, January 15, 1904, Ibid., pp .. 410-11. 
(26) 1.1?.!£•, PP• 411-12. 
(~7) ..!J'u!, P• 412. 
7 
the Japanese Minister had asked for his passport and would 
probably leave that night,. February 7, 1904. 28 
The war started on February 9, 1904, with the Japanese 
torpedo boats firing upon the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.29 
War was not forma.1ly declared until February 10, 1904. In 
her declaration of war Japan said she had always tried to 
promote peace in the Far Ea.st and to secure the future of her 
eountry without injury to the rights and interests of other 
countriea. 30 
Japan gave as reason for the war the fact that Russia, 
while delaying the que-stion of negotiation, advocated peace, 
yet made military and naval preparations to accomplish her 
wishes in the Far East. Japan further said that her safety 
depended upon the separate ,existence or Korea and that Russia 
had disregarded her solemn treaty pledges to China and had 
failed to evacuate Manchuria as she had promised to the 
other powers. Instead, Russia had strengthened herself to 
try to hold Manchuria.31 
Kogoro Takahira., the Japanese Minister to the United 
States, asked Secretary Hay to let the United States embassy 
in st. Petersburg and the United States consulates elsewhere 
in Russia, look after her interests in Russia if Ruseia 
(28) McCormick to Hayt February 7, 1904 , Ibid., pp. 708-09. 
(29) l!?i,g., p. 709. The majority or authorities agree that 
the Japanese !ired on the Rusaians first, but according to 
a letter Griseom to Hay, February 9, 1904, Ibid., P• 413, 
the telegram announcing the engagement said that the Russian 
gunboat Korietz started the battle by firing upon the Japa-
nese torpedo boats February 9, 1904. 
(30) ll.1.g., P• 414. 
(31) Ibid. 
8 
would consent. 32 On February 9, 1904, in a letter from 
McCormick to Hay, Russia informed the United States that she 
had no objection to the American representatives looking 
after the interests of Japan a!ter Japan had withdrawn her 
diplomatic and consular representativee. 33 
The United States Department of State informed her 
consular officers to take charge of the Japanese consulates 
and archive when requested to do so by Japan, with the under-
standing that the United States officials should have no 
consular duties or authority. They should be permitted to 
use thei.r good offices only for the protection of Japanese 
subjects and their interests.34 
Secretary Hay corresponded with both Russia and Japan 
on February 10, expressing the desire of the United States 
that the belligerents respect the neutrality o! China. and 
her administrative entity. He asked that the area. of hos-
tilities be localized and limited to prevent undue excitement 
to the Chinese and their trade. 35 
In response to Hay's letter, Japan agreed to respect 
China's neutrality if China. assumed such an attitude and 
ir Russia agreed to respect the same. 36 Ruesia answered 
(32) Ibid., P• 430. 
(33) McCormick to Hay, February 9, 1904, ~., p. 714. 
(34) Loomis to McCormick, February 9, 1904, ~-, PP• 714-15. 
{35) House of' Representatives, 56th Congress, 2d Seas., Doc-
ument 551, John Bassett Moore, A Digest .QI. International 
~, Washington, 1906, V, 552. 
(36) Griscom to Hay, February 15, 1904, Foreign Relations 
1904, ..Q..12• ill•, P• 419. 
favorably to the safeguarding of China's neutrality, giving 
three rules by which she agreed to do sa.me: (1) China 
9 
must respect all clauses of neutrality; (2) the Japanese gov-
ernment must observe the engagements entered into with the 
powers, as ell as the principles of international law; (3) the 
37 neutralization should not include Manchuria.. 
Given this understanding between the belligerents, the 
Chinese Empire agreed to remain neutrai. 38 
The United States proclamation of neutrality during the 
ar was issued by Preeident Roosevelt February 11, 1904. He 
reminded the people or the United States to observe our law 
of neutrality passed April 20, 1818. This law prohibits 
persons in the United States rrom joining or helping raise 
forces to aid either side !n case of foreign war, from 
attempting to fit out or arm any veaeel intended for either 
belligerent, or from repairing or adding any equipment to 
any war vessel or either belligerent. 39 
The proclamation issued by President Roosevelt further 
provided that no supplies should be furnished the ships of 
either country except rood necessary for the subeistanoe 
of the crew or enough caal to get them to their nearest home 
port. All $hips must depart within twenty-four hours unless 
they were being repaired, a severe storm held them up, or 
(37) :McCormick to Hay, February 19, 1904 , Ibid • . , p. '724. 
( 38) lfil-, P• 422 • 
(39) United States Statutes at Large, 58th Congress, XXXIII, 
part 2, Private Laws, Concurrent Resolutions and Proclamations, 
Washington, 1905, PP• 2332-33. ~ 
if a.n enemy ship had ·departed less than twenty-four hours 
previous. If several belligerent vessels were in a port 
10 
they must leave in alternate order every twenty-four hours. 
All privileges granted one of the belligerents must also be 
granted to the other. The following _principles, a.e agreed to 
by Russia July 22, 1854, w·ere binding; (1) goode belonging to 
citizens of either belligerent, unless it wa.$ contraband of 
wa.r, when on board a. neutral ship was not subject to con:risca.-
tion; (2) property of neutrals a.board an enemy ship, unless it 
was contraband of war, could not be .confiscated. The United 
States wo,uld not proteet any ei tizen who attempted to break 
blockade·, transport contraband of wa.r or sold!ers. 40 
At the beginning of the war each of the eountr'ies issued 
ite rules of conduct for the war. The question of contra.band 
caused many controversies between ea.ch of the belligerents 
and other countries of the world . 41 
Several months lat~rs on January 5, 1906, the Kaiser 
had Speek von Sternberg, his A.mbaseador to t he United States, 
wire President Roosevelt his pleasure at hearing tha.t Roose-
velt firmly adhered to the policy of the Open Door and the 
actual integrity or China. The Kaiser $earned assured that a 
European coalition headed by France planned to convince the 
belligerents that peace could not be mad.e without compen-
(40) ~ .. , PP• 2333-35. 
(41) For a.list of contra.band and the rules f'or warfare as 
issued by Russia, see Department of Commerce and Labor, :Bureau 
of Statistics , Monthly Consular Reports, Washington, 1904, 
LXXX, no. 284, pp . 39~-98. For th-e Japanese rules see same, 
pp. 392, 93-96.. For a. discussion of the Tarious eases in 
which the United States oi ti .sens were a part see Fore!K!} 
.;;.;R.:::e_l.,;;;.::a_,t..:.io •• n.s 1904-.Qjl. 
11 
ation for the neutral powers. The Kaiser suggested that 
this plan could be frustrated if Roosevelt would send 
letter to every country having interests in the Far East 
asking whether they would pledge not to demand compensa-
tion tor themselves in China or elsewhere for their eff orts. 
toward peace.42 
S&cretary Hay sent a circular letter on this subject 
through our Amba.ssadors to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal, January 13,1905. In 
this letter Hay asked what the Kaiser had suggested. He 
pledged the United States to continue to maintain the in-
tegrity of China and the Open Door with equal commercial 
opportunity for a.11. 43 All of the countries replied 
favorably, showing either that the Kaiser was wrong about 
the coalition or that it wa.s headed off. 44 
The most important battles of the war, Port Arthur, 
Muckden, and the Sea of Japan, were won by the Japanese. 
Russia never had her complete army in the Far Ea.st, because, 
although protected by her alliance with France, she was 
afraid to leave her German frontier ungU&rded. 45 
The Kaiser had encouraged the Tear in the Far East 
(42) Thayer, Hay, ..2£• .211•, PP• 385-86. 
(43) House of Representatives, 59th Congress, 1st Seas., 
Document 1, Foreign Relations With the Annual Message .Qi 
t he President 1905, Washington, 1906, PP• l rr. 
- -
( 44) Thayer, Hay, .Q.'Q• cit., PP• 262-63. 
( 45 ) J . H. Gubbins,~ Making of Modern Japan, London, 
1922, PP• 262-63 . 
12 
but at the beginning of the war he shed no tears over the 
Russian reverses, for the weaker Russia became, the les 
need he had to fear her a.s a. neighbor. At the ea.me time, 
when Japan continued to win, all European powers felt sure 
that the defeat of Russia might cause a re · djuatment or 
world polLtice. Also it would bring up the question that 
the Kaiser had called the "Yellow Per11. 1146 
The war continued throughout 1904 and 1905. All during 
the war, the Russian people opposed the fighting while the 
opposite was true in Japan where the people were eager to 
fight.47 In spite of her great losses, Russia with her 
vast population could continue repleniehing her army, 
whereas Japan, though victorious, was showing the loss of 
men. 48 
Several countries ma.de peace overtures during 1904 
and 1905 but found Japan unwilling to accept, yet it was 
Japan who asked President Roosevelt to intervene in the 
summer of 1905. 49 
{46) William Roncoe Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, .!J11.!!!1-
mate Biography, New York, 19:31, P• 225. 
(47) Gubbins, .Q.R• oit., P• 258. 
{48) Thayer, Roosevelt, .Q.12.• ..21!•, P• 226. 
(49) Dennett, o. cit., PP• 175-77. 
Chapter II 
ROOSEVELT EXTElIDS HIS GOOD OFFICES 
The attitudes of the different countries toward a 
pee,ceful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war can be better 
understood after studying their feelings toward the belli-
gerents .. 
In Germany, Kaiser Vlillia:m II, al though apparently 
friendly toward Russia, had i.mpatiently awaited the out-
break of' the war. 0 ••• he had hoped· that the stress o'f a 
great conflict abroad would force '.l:ea..r liioholas to seek sup-
port and ,above all, good advice, from his German eolleague .. "1 
Frsi,nce wa.s an ally of Russia though she to,ok no J;)art 
in the war. Later on it was rumored that she planned to 
try to end the war by a. concert of nations .. 2 
England was allied with Japan and had p.romised to aid 
her is ease of the entrance of a. third party. They ha.d 
signed their first treaty January 30, 1902., and a new one 
August 2:; 1905.5 
Publie opinion in the United States wa.s favorable 
toward Japan, whose war loans were floated on the American 
·t 1} Geoffrey Danlo:p, · Memoir§ :Q.f. Prince Y.Q!1 Bulfmr Bostoii"; 
1931, p .. 70 .. 
(2} See Chapter I, P• 11~ 
(3) Alfred L. ?. Dennis:1 ~ Angl~-Japa.nes.e Alliance, 
Berkeley, 1923, :p .. 1. 
14 
money ma.rket.4 President Roosevelt was pleased with 
every Japanese victory, and was ready to join Japan if 
Russia had seized an American vessel. Although in sympathy 
with Japan, Roosevelt wanted peace between these countries. 5 
Efforts to restore peaceful relations between Russia 
and Japan were advocated according to four different methods 
by peacemakers: (1) mediation through England and France, 
(2) mediation by the United States, (3) direct negotiations 
between Japan and Russia, (4) an international conference 
of powers. "Over all hung the shadow of intervention by a 
concert of owers. 116 
The method or intervention by a concert of nations in 
• 
a conference had been thwarted by Roosevelt at the suggestion 
of the Kaiser, when Roosevelt asked the countries to pledge 
that they would not demand concessions in China for their 
efforts toward peace, as explained in Chapter I. 
On December 27, 1904, Roosevelt wrote Spring Rice, 
secretary or the British embusy in Russia, that he had de-
cided definitely what he would do in regard to the Far Eastern 
situation i.f the opportunity presented itself; however he 
said it was best not to write his conclusions. 7 Roosevelt 
(4) !h!. Memoirs of Count Witte, Translated from the 
Original Russian Manuscript and Edited by Abra.ham Yarmolinsky, 
Garden City, 1921, p . 140 
( 5) Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
Berkeley, 1923, P• 1. 
(6) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt .2.!!.Q. the Russo-Japanese War, 
Garden City, 1925, P• 170. 
( 7) Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships .QI. .§1.r 
Cecil Spring Rice, Cambridge, 1929, I , 443-44. 
15 
went on to .say that he could not trust the British 
Ambassador and that he would like to have Spring Rice come 
over to visit him. Roosevelt summarized the situation thus: 
••• we must trust in the Lord and keep our powder 
dry and our eyes open •••• 1 intend, as your people 
should intend, to be vigilant and reaso~bly ready 
to adopt whatever course is called for. 
In a letter to George Otto Trevelyan, British states-
man and historian, on March 9, 1905, Roosevelt said that six 
weeks earlier he had written to the Russian government, and 
later expressed the same idea. through the French government, 
advising Russia to make peace. He had told Russia that 
unless· they were confident of turning defeat into victory 
they should make peace, because Japan would give more fa-
vorable peace terms at that time; in a letter to King 
Edward of ...:ingland the same day, Roosevelt expressed the same 
idea a.gain. 9 
Roosevelt told John Hay by letter March ~O, 1905, that 
both Takahira, the Jal)&nese Minister to the United States, 
and Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador to the United 
States, had been to see him about peace negotiations. Roose-
velt said that very little progress had been made as neither· 
one wanted to make the first advances. Ca.ssini told the 
President that he personally wanted peace but that his 
country wanted to continue the war. Roosevelt said it 
appeared that no other eountry wanted to act as peacemaker 
(8) 1.lUJ!•, P• 446. 
(9) Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His 
Times, New York, 1920, II, 376. 
( 10) .I:!2.!J!•, P• 377. 
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and he told Hay that he wished anyone besidea himself 
would act in that capacity. 10 
Roosevelt wrote Speck von Sternberg, the German Am-
bassador,March 31, 1905. He assured the Ambassador that 
he, like the Kaiser, opposed the-peace negotiations being 
considered in a congress of nations, adding that like views 
were held by the British and Japanese governments. Roosevelt 
said he had again advised the Ruesian Ambassador to make 
peace.11 
The President reviewed the progress behind the scenes 
in a letter to Secretary Hay on April 2, 1905. He had seen 
Casaini twice; Takahira, Durand, the British Ambassador to 
the United States, and Jusserand, the French Minister to 
the United States, once each; and Speck von Sternberg 
three or four times during the week past. The information 
gleaned from these interviews was to the effect that the 
Kaiser was worried because he did not want a congress of 
powers to make peace; that Germany and Great Britain 
distrusted eaeb other., each suspecting the other of a.n 
unfriendly alliance; that although the Russian government 
had announced officially that they wished to extend the 
war, Ambassador Cassini said that undoubtedly Russia would 
make peace on honorable terms; Takahira said that Japan 
would ask for an indemnity, and Roosevelt added that if 
(10) 
(11) 
Ibid., P• 377. 
-
Ibid., pp. 377-78. 
17 
Japan continued winning, she would probably demand a still 
greater indemnity.12 
France, the ally of Russia, made the first suggestion 
of mediation on the occasion of a diplomatic reception 
/ 
April 5, 1905. Deloasse in t alking with the Japanese Mini-
ster, Montrono, suggested that he thought he could bring 
Russia and Japan together in an effort to negotiate peace if 
Japan ould not ask for a.ny Russian territory or an indem-
nity. Japan seemed pleased that France was intere ted in 
helping make peace, and asked Deloaese' if he could confirm 
his belief that Russ i a was sincere in her desire to make 
peace. Delea.es~ answered in the affirmative. Japan pointed 
out, however, that they were being asked to agree to certain 
conditions previous to the negotiations, while Russia was 
t k . l 13 no ma 1ng any p edge. 
The Japanese government considered the French overture 
!or over a week, then Komura through Ta.kahira informed 
Roosevelt about the offer. Their message went to Secretary 
Taft who was in charge of diploma.tic affairs while President 
Roosevelt was in the we:st on a speaking tour and hunting 
trip. Takahira asked Taft to relay the information to 
the President immediately.14 Taft did so, keeping the 
communication strictly confidential as Taka.hira requested. 
(12} ~., PP• 378-79. 
(13) Dennett, -2:Q• cit., pp. 174-75. 
(14) Ibid., P• 175. 
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Takahira. said to explain that "the Japanese .have no in-
tentions to close the door to friendly offices exerted 
15 purely for the purpose o! bringing the belligerents together•" 
Komura relayed further through Taka.hira that the good offices 
of some power might be necessary, though he held the opinion, 
a.a he thought President Roosevelt did, that it would be unwise 
to depart from direct negotiations regarding the peace. 
President Roosevelt answered the letter from Ta.ft on 
April 20, 1905, reemphasizing his belief that peace should 
be direct between Russia and Japan. He did not mention what 
he thought the terms of peace should be except to say that 
Japan should maintain her policy or the Open Door in Man-
. 16 
ehuria and of restoring it to China. 
This information was sent on to Komura, who answered 
Roosevelt's letter April 25, 1905. Komura declared that Japan 
was in ravor or the Open Door in Manchuria and of restoring 
Manchuria to China.. He said the Japanese government would 
be gratified if Roosevelt would make any suggestions "in 
regard to the steps to be taken or the measures to be adopted 
by Japan in order to pave the way for the inauguration of 
such negotiations. 1117 
The Japanese e·eemed to be getting anxious to make 
peace. Lloyd c. Grisoom, the United States Minister to 
(15) Barnes, the assistant secretary of wa.r, to Loeb, the 
President's secretary, Ibid., PP• 176- 77. 
(16) Roosevelt to Taft, Ibid., P• 178. 
(17) Barnes to Loeb,~-, pp. 179-80. 
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Japan, wrote that Dennisono or the .Japanese Foreign office 
aid that Japan was eager to make peace through Roosevelt. 
Takahira asked a.gain for strict secrecy about all communi-
cations. Taft a.eked RooseTelt if it would be wise to begin 
negotiations through Juss~ra.nd, the French Ambassador to the 
United States. Japanese officials were seemingly lees insis-
tent on a money settlement and also were willing to avoid a 
naval battle -18 
Roosevelt was not eatiefied with the way negotiations 
were progressing so he decided to return to Washington one 
week ooner than he had planned. He told Taft to ask Taka-
hira if it would be advisable for Taft to see Cas$1n1 and 
tell him that the President on his own motion directed Taft 
to ee whether the two countries could not get together and 
negotiate direct.19 Rooaevelt told Tatt that it he did see 
Cassini on this question he should suggest that the repre-
sentat1Tes should have a tree talk as a preliminary without 
any intermediary.20 
Secretary Taf't sent Roosevelt Komura's answer with a 
comment on his interview with Takahira. Komura expressed 
appreciation to Roosevelt tor shortening hie vacation in 
the interest or peace. Komura said that the Japanese gov-
ernment doubted whether Roosevelt ' • plan would be successful 
because or the views and temperament of Count Cassin!. 
( 18) l.:2ll · 
(19} Roosevelt to Taft, April 27, 1905, Biahop, ~· cit., 
P• 380. 
( 20) Ibid. 
20 
Komura stated that his government believed, like Roosevelt, 
that the time had come when the question of pe.e.ce could be 
hoped for in the near future. Komura said that they expected 
to be able to give Roosevelt a plan of procedure by the time 
he returned to ashington. 21 In his interview with Taft, 
Taka.hira intimated that Japan wanted to make peace before 
they had a. nnava.l battle in order tba t Russia might ma.lee 
peace 1th honor.n22 
Takahira had told his government that popular sentiment 
in the United States would support an indemnity and terri-
torial demand. Takahira had begun to doubt the advisability 
of an indemnity and said that Roosevelt's opinion of the 
question of territory and indemnity would bear strength in 
Japan. He anted to know Roosevelt's idea about the situation 
in Japan. Takahira said that the country was divided, some 
in favor of peace and others in favor of continuing the war. 
Personally he thought Japan had accomplished her war aime 
wen she drove the Russians out or 1ita.nchuria and gained con-
trol or the railroad. 23 
It is evident that Taft had telegraphed Roosevelt the 
results of the interview previous to this letter. 24 
On April io, 1905, Roosevelt answered that he agreed with 
the Japanese that the peace terms should be direct. 
(21) Taft to Roosevelt, May 2, 1905, Dennett,~· cit., pp . 
183-84. 
(22) Ibid., P· 184. 
(23) Ibid . 
(24) Bishop,~· ..Q..!1., p. 380. 
21 
I heartily agree with the Japanese terms of peace, 
in so far a.s they include Japan having control over 
Korea, retaining possession or Port Arthur and Dalney, 
and operating the Harbin, Mu~kden, Port Arthur Railway, 
while restoring Manchuria to China with the guarantee 
of the Open Door. As to the proposed indemnity and 
the cession or Russian territory I am not yet prepared 
to express mys,elf def'ini tely; and indeed, do not as 
yet feel called upon to express myself definitely.~5 
Roosevelt returned to Washington May 13 but round no 
new indications of peace. 26 That day he wrote to Spring 
Rioe, expressing a desire for Germany and England to be 
more friendly. In this same letter the President considered 
what results the Russian fleet would have in eastern waters, 
saying the Russian fleet was materially aom what stronger 
than the Japanese, but tha.t he believed thie would be more 
than offset by Japanese superiority in morals and training. 27 
Roosevelt's judgment was proved right when the Japanese 
completely defeated the Russian fleet in the battle of the 
Sea of Japan, May 26 and 27.28 
Roosevelt went on to say in this letter tha.t he wished 
the Japanese and Russians had ma.de peace after the battle 
of Mu~kden. He had told the Japanese officials before 
that a continuation of the war would coat more than any 
indemnity she could eollect, but that he thought, "Just at 
this time, Russia. is riding a high horse and will not talk 
(25) .[Q!g•, PP• 380-81 • 
( 26) Ibid., P• 381. 
( 2?} Gwynn, 
.212. ill· ' PP• 469-?1 • 
(28) Paul Hibbert Clyde, a History or~ Modern~ 
Contemporary!!£~' New York, 1937, P• 396. 
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pea.ce."29 
In writing to George Otto Trevelyan on May 13, Roose-
velt said that he liked the Russian people but found those 
men at the head of the government untrustworthy. He eaid 
that the Japa.nese would be a valuable raotor in the civili-
zation of the future. He thought, though, that the Japanese 
would be prejudiced against the white race. 30 In this letter 
he stated, "It is evident that Ja.~n is now anxious to have 
me try to make peace. 11 31 
Komura wrote to Roosevelt througp. Takahira a letter 
asking him to act as media.tor. Komura said that since they 
had just completely destroyed the Russian navy they expected 
Russia to ~e desirous of making peace, and that Japan was 
ready to negotiate peace directly after some neutral power 
in whom the Japanese had confidence had brought them to-
gether for that purpose. He hoped that the President would 
be disposed to undertake this service a.nd ttentirely of his 
own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents 
to come together ror the purpose ot direct negotiation. 1132 
It was to be understood that this letter was neither a 
direct nor an indirect approach to Russia on the subject or 
peace. Komura said he wae willing to leave it to President 
Roosevelt to decide on a course of procedure and whether 
T29) 
( 30} 
( 31) 
( 32) 
Gwynn, .Qll• ill·, PP• 469-71. 
Bishop, .2P.• eit., p. 381. 
Roosevelt to Lodge, Ma.y 15, 1905, Ibid. 
Dennett, 21?.• cit., P• 215. 
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he would consult other powers about the suggested invitation. 
Roosevelt saw Cassini, the Russian Ambassador, soon 
after receiving this communication , and asked him to tell 
the Tsar that he thought Russia. could not win the war and 
they should ke peace. He said further that if he could 
get the consent or Russia and Japan he would like to haTe 
them meet and reconcile their differences. Roosevelt felt 
certain that he could get Japan to consent if Russia would. 33 
Meyer, who had been transferred as Ambassador in Italy 
to Russia, communio~ted (June 2, 1905) with Mr. Adee, the Assistant 
United States Secretary of State, about conditions in Russia. 
The Ruesian press laid the blame for misfortune of war on 
the Bureaucracy and asked the people to say what should be 
done. Meyer predicted some reform by the government. 34 
The Kai ,ser informed Roosevelt June 3, 1905; tha. t he 
thought Russia should make peace. He promised that he 
would tacitly support any peace effort that Roosevelt might 
35 
make. 
Mr. Tower, the United States Ambassador to Germany, 
wired Roosevelt the substance of a note from the Kaiser, 
the same day. The Kaiser said that when news of the recent 
defeat or the Russian fleet reached st. Petersburg, the lire 
of the Tsar would be in danger . 36 
( 33) 
( 34) 
( 35) 
( 36) 
Biehop, .Q.;Q• .211•, P• 384. 
Dennett , .2.£. ill· , p . 21 7 • 
Bishop, .Q.12• .£!..!•, 384. 
Dennett, .Q.:Q• !U!•, P• 217. 
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The Kaiser wrote to the Tsar June 3, urging him to 
make peace immediately, impressing upon him the tact that 
the Japanese respected the Americana and their President 
and that he would appeal to Roosevelt to bring the Japanese 
to reasonable proposals. The Kaiser suggested that the 
Tsar communicate with Roosevelt either through Meyer or 
himselr. 37 
Upon receiving the note from the Kaiser on June 3, 
mow r had a personal interview with him. The Kaiser again 
expressed fear for the life of the Taar. With apprehension 
he pictured the disastrous results to the world as well as 
to Russia if' the Tsar should die, as this would leave his 
throne to an infant heir and necessitate a long regency 
under a Grand Duke. 38 
The Kaiser's suggestion did not aatisfy Roosevelt. He 
did not ant to bring pressure against Japan to make certain 
peaoe terms to suit Russia. He felt that he could not trust 
Cassini or Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ot 
ussia, 39 so he instructed Meyer to 813e the Tsar in person. 
President Roosevelt directer Meyer as follows, that 
he should: (1) call on the Tsar at once, telling him that 
he did so at the request or the President, to press upon 
him the advisability or sending representatives to meet 
1th the Japanese representatives to see if peace could 
{37} Kaiser to the Tsar, Bishop, .Q.12.• .Qi!., P• 385. 
(38) Tower to Roosevelt, Dennett, .Q.R• .!!!•, p. 219. 
(39) Roosevelt to Meyer, Bieho~, .9.12. cit., P• 385. 
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not be ma.de; (2) tell the Tsar that all the powers believed 
Russia's oauee was lost and that it the war went on sh 
would lose all her possessions in the Far ast; (3) say 
that he @oosevel~thought that representa tives of the two 
countries should meet direct without any intermediary; 
(4) tell the Tsar that an intermediary power would arrange 
to have the represent tives meet if both sides consented. 
After the meeting ther-e should be plenty of time to confer 
or get suggestions from any outside friend as to what the 
peace terms should be.40 
If Rus.eia will consent to such a meeting the Presi-
dent ill try to get Japan's consent; acting simply 
on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has 41 
consented, and the President believes he ill succeed. 
The President agree to keep the answer and all oomnrt1ni-
cations secret until Japan agreed. Roosevelt then would 
send out identical letters asking ea.ch government to agree 
to meet, after which they could meet. Roosevelt suggested 
that they meet -some place between Harbin and Mu ... kden. 42 
The fallowing day Meyer had a priTate interview with 
the Tsar. Had Meyer not carried important news from the 
President he ould have had to wait till the following day 
to see the Tsar as this d3'V was the Tsarina 's birthday. 
Meyer delivered the President's message orally f'ir t but 
when the Tsar asked for time to consider, he read it 
sentence by sentence. 
(40) Dertnett, ~· .s!!!•t pp. 221-22. 
( 41) 11?.!.!· 
( 42) lli_!!. 
26 
Meyer then summed up conditions in Russia to impress 
the Tsa.r with the need to ma.ke peace. Finally the Tsar 
confessed that Meyer had come at a psyohological time as 
Japan had not been on Russian soil yet. The Tear said that 
it was important tha.t the meeting to make peace take place 
43 before that happened. 
In his letter informing the President of the Tsar 's 
answer, Meyer said that the Tsar was convinced that the 
people would support him 1n continuing the war. Neverthe-
less, he uthorized Meyer to say that he accepted and con-
sented to the President's instructions as sent by eyer; 
that is, if the President on his own initiative would get 
the consent of the Japanese to send plenipotentiaries to 
meet with the Russian plenipotentiaries without intermediary 
to endeavor to make peace, he would consent. The Tsar felt 
that it was very necessary to keep his acceptance secret 
until Japan had accepted. The esident would then a. sk 
both powers to agree to meet. The Tsar expressed his con-
fidence in the President and hoped the old friendship 
would return between them. 44 
The oppoeite orders were sent to Count Caesini on 
June 6, 1905. Cassini said that Meyer must have misunder-
stood the Tsar' s answer. He showed a communication fr.om 
Lamsdorff aaying that the Tsar would not ask for mediation 
(43) M.A. DeWolfe Howe, George :!.2!! Lengerke Meyer His 
Life and Public SerTicep, New York, 1920, pp. 157-62. 
( 44) .!.ill· 
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btit wottld e.ccei,t the erforie ot a trien4ly co-utry which 
m1ght be a.ble to -cause Jal')an to modera:te te:ms and set her 
view •· Lamadonr ver1tie4 l{qer'e report,, how(n1n:·. a the 
exchang& of a cable mesaase-4'° 
Haviq receivied :ta.v,0ra.'ble ffllSWen from both la.J)M antl 
Rus•ltb R(Joaevel t se1tt 1dent1cal notes to each co.Uttb'y Utrough 
Amba.at;adora Reyer anti G;ri•o.em. The, notes we.re as tcllo ,u 
The President feels that the time ha.s come when, h 
the interest ot all ma.nk1:n:4, he must endeavor t ,o see 
tr it ts uot poa1d.ble to bring t ,o n.n end the terr1.ble 
an4 lanaenta.ble eon!lic-t. now being r.ged. Vii th. both 
Runia and Japan the U:ait.e.d Stat.ea has inb.er1te4 ties 
a-r r.r1endsh.1p and good will • It hopes tor the »ros ... 
;per1 ty and welfare t>'l -ea.cl1, a.n4 it, feele that the 
progret5S ot tho world i:& set back by the war 'between 
the-se two (tZ'e .t nations. i'he· President aeeordtngly 
urge thee Russian a.ml Japanese GovernmtlDt$, not only 
ror t.hei:r OVlll sak-ea, but in the 1nte.rellt ot the whole 
clvillaed -Wt>rlti, to o:pe-n al:rin:it uegot.ta.tio-na tor 
peace w.1 t.h one another.. Toe P:reai.de-nt augg~sta that 
thetJ-e peace neg.o-t,ia:tictns be conducted direc-tly and 
excluively betwee-n the be111gerents--tn oth11r ,rordth 
that tbere may be a meeting of Ruaeian and Japau-eee 
plenipotentia.ries or 4el.e:ga.tes without any intermedia.17, 
in orae.r to see if it is not :possible to'tf these repre-
sentatives of the two power:l to agree to terma ot 
peaee. The Pnaident ea.rnest1:i a.ska that the Ruastan 
Government do now .ag-l'ee to auch meeting:, and its o.sk1ng 
the J a.pe.nese Gov•rtm1ent l!ke\11:se to agree-. While the 
Preei dent doeo Mt 'f ef1l tha. t a.ny irrterrnedtary ahauld 
'be called in in ftt,pect to the peace negotiati.o-ns them-
• lve:h he. iB en.tir•lY willing to do, what he properly 
can it the two :powers <u>»cerne4 f'eel that hts services 
will be of &i~ ln ar1~ng the preliminaries .a,e to the 
ti e and plaee Gf mttet:tng; but it fftm these pre1im1narieu 
cu be: e.rranged dir-eatl:r between the tw-0 poweriJ, or in 
any other wa·:h the Preatdent will ~ gl~d1 as hi& eole 
urpoae is to .brins e.br:rut, a. meeting wtdoh the 9•1e 
oi'f'ilized wt>X"ld will .Pl"lrY may re-aUlt in pea<:ur. 
The J ~nee e;ovemment a.n&wered favors.bt7· t.o llr, 
. . . i IJ ·_ - . l " · - - ·· id .···!@' )! 
( 46) Loom1.e. io Heyer, June· a, l905 t F,o.£!18'!! B,elAti<>n.s Ji9,0f>, 
P• 80?,... 
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Roosevelt's communication on June 8, tw-0 days later. The 
message aid that Japan, after very serious consideration, 
had concluded that in the interest of the peace ot· the 
world at large as well e of Japan, th Imperial Government 
agreed to 
appoint plenipotentiaries or Japan to meet pleni-
potentiaries of Rusaia at such time and pla~e as 
may be found to be mutually agreeable and conven-
ient, !or the purpose of negotiating and concluding 
terms of peaoe direetly4ftnd exclusively between the 
two belligerent powers. 
On June 12, 1905, the Russian answer waa received. 
Count Lamsdorff answered Roosevelt's communication using 
the President's very words to express reply. The Emperor, 
he said, was pleased to have Roosevelt's note, further proof 
or the friendship of the United Sta.tee and Russia. The 
Tsar was glad that Roosevelt expressed a like desire as 
his for universal peace. 
With regard to the eventual meeting or Russian and 
Japanese plenipotentiaries u1n order to see if it ie 
not possible for the to powers to agree to terms or 
peace," the Imperial Govermnent has no objection in 
principle to this endiftvor if the Japanese Government 
expresses the desire. 
By comparing the two replies ot acceptance, it can be 
eeen that the Russi ns were more evasive. They accepted 
in Roosevelt's own words and did not make any definite 
eommi tment. 
(47) Griacom to the Secretary of State,~-, p. 809. 
(48) La.msdorff to eyer, June 12, 1905, Ibid., P• 811. 
Chapter III 
PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 
In the identical letters sent to Russia and Japan by 
President Roosevelt June 8, 1905, he had asked that Russia 
and Japan send plenipotentiaries to meet and make peace.1 
He told them that he was entirely willing to do what he 
properly eould if the two po ers concerned felt that hie 
services would be or aid in arranging the preliminaries 
as to the time and pl ee of meeting. 2 
At. first Russia propoaed to meet at Paris, and Japan 
proposed Chefoo. Since each country had proposed a differ-
ent pl ce, Roosevelt suggested the Hague . Japan objected 
to going to any European city and suggested that they 
assemble in some city in the United States . 3 In the mean-
time, Ca.ssini told Roosevelt that his government preferred 
Washington to the Hague if Paris was objectionable for any 
reason. Russia desired Washington "especially since the 
presence or the President, initiator of the meet.ing, can 
exercise a beneficent in!luene~ toward the end we all have 
in view. n 4 
Lamsdorff tried to change the meeting place June 16, 
1905 , even though he had instructed Cassini to accept 
{l} Chapter II, P• 27• 
(2) Foreign Relations 1905, ~· 80?. 
(3) Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt .!!.ru! the Russo-Japanese War, 
Garden City, 1925, p. 199. 
( 4) ~. , p. 228. 
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W ahington. He told Meyer that he objected to Washington 
because of the great distance from J. ussia, the extreme 
summer hea t, and beoauae the Russian ba.ssa.dor, Cassini, 
as being replaced.6 Meyer assured Lamsdorff that thia de-
sire for a change of the place of meeting was out of order 
since the President had waited until both countries had 
a.greed before accepting any city.6 
Roosevelt wrote Meyer June 16, 1905, that he had 
announced publicly that Washington would be the meeting 
place and he regarded the selection settled. RooeeTelt 
told ·eyer that if Lamsdorff refused to accept Washington, 
he should see the Tsar and explain that it would be im-
possible to change meeting places. 7 
'. 
In a letter June 18, 1906, Meyer wrote that he had 
just received word from Lamsdorff that 0 His ajesty the 
Emperor wees no objection to the choice of Washington as a 
place of conference for the Russian and Japanese plenipo• 
tentiaries. 118 
As previously stated Russia answered the President's 
invitation to ma.lee peace in exactly hie own words. This 
was interpreted by Japan as euggestin that the Russians 
might aend men of an interior rank without power to make 
{ 5) 
( 6 ) 
{ 7) 
Ibid., P• 228. 
Ibid. 
-
~., P• 226. 
{8 ) Meyer to Rooaevelt, June 18 , 1905, Foreign Relations 
1905, P• 811. 
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peaee. 9 
xperience has taught the necessity of 1ca.ution. and 
the Japanese Government thought that by securing at 
the, outset a common understanding upon the subject 
they would preclude possibility of any difficulty 
arising in the initial stage of negotiations and 
would smooth15he way for the real work or the ne-gotiators ••• 
The Japane,se sai they would accept the President's 
opinion or the Russian intentions. They said they would 
appoint plenipotentiaries in time to be in Washington by 
the tenth of' August, "with full powers to negotiate and 
conclude terms of pea.oe. ull 
The Secretary of State suggested on June 23 that he 
have the Russian government send the names of her probable 
plenipotentiaries to President Roosevelt, who planned to 
exchange the names at Washington before he publicly 
announced them. 12 
Because or fear by the Japanese of trickery, Roosevelt 
asked that at the time or appointment the Rus~ians announce 
that "they a.r~ named plenipotentiaries to negotiate and 
conclude a treaty of peace with Japa.n."13 
All or the other arrangements were to be completed 
before the question of an armistice would be raised. 14 
(9) Griscom to Secretary or State, June 18. 1905, Ibid., 
PP• 811-12. 
(10) Ibid. 
( 11) 
~· 
( 12) Secretary of State to Meyer , June 25, 1905, lE..!J!•, 812. 
(13) lliA· 
(14) 
.!ill· 
Secretary Hay wrote Meyer to ee i! the Russians could 
meet the first ten days in August, 1905.15 The Minister 
or Foreign Affairs for Russia answered in the affirmative, 
although the Tsar thought the date rather distant.16 
Roosevelt urged both countries to send their most 
capable men. He kept each country informed about who he 
thought would be appointed by the other power. 
r. Roosevelt wrote !eyer July 1, 1905, that he would 
make public the names of the plenipotentiaries on the 
following onday. 17 The Japanese appointed Baron Jutaro 
Komura and Kogoro Takahira, while Russia at length selected 
Sergius Witte and Baren Rosen. 18 
The Tsar had fir t ppointed Uelidov, the Russian 
----Ambassador to France, who did not accept the commission. 
Then ouravieff, the Ruasian Ambassador to Paris, was 
selected, but was taken 111 and forced to decline. Finally 
the Tsar ~ppointed Sergius Witte, former Minister or 
Finance. 19 The other offic.ia.1 delegate was the Russian 
Ambassador at Washington, Baron Roa,en . 
Besides the two ma.in delegates, a force of secretaries, 
international law experts, and newspaper correspondents 
{15) Secretary or State to eyer, June 24, 1905, Ibid., 
P• 813. 
(16) Meyer to Secretary or State, June 29, 1905, l.Bi2.•, 
P• 815. 
(17} Roosevelt to , eyer, July 1, 1905, ~., P• 815. 
(18) .!l?.!.£•, PP• 814-17. 
(19) eyer to Sec ret ry of State, July 13, 1905, Ibid. 
p. 819. 
were sent to the conference. 
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20 
-oKLrnom 
Baron Jutaro Komura, Minister of Foreig -RDitfU.lta, ;1rJu~:JrAL COLLEG! 
L ID R ""\ lt Y 
and Kogoro Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador at Washin~~on, 
OCT 27 1939 
headed the Japanese delegation. They were accompanied by a 
ta.ff or a.ssista.nta. 21 
Roosevelt, having kept in close communication with 
william II, informed him or his efforts to make peace be-
tween Russia and Japan. In answer to a communication re-
ceived t'rom Roosevelt on June 7, the Kaiser agreed with the 
Pres· dent 'e views regarding the peace, and said he had done 
everything po sible to second his action. He said that as 
far as he could tell, all countries on the continent were 
hoping that his plan would succeed. "There is but one 
power, not on our continent, which I am a.~raid will hold 
aloof and create diffioul ties ••• •• ~nglan~ 22 
(20) Foreign Relations~, .QR• ill·, pp. 819-20. These 
included: Th. Martens, privy oouncelor, member or the 
counsel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; J. Schipoff, 
privy councilor, ehief of the treasury division at the Min-
istry of Finance; ajar-General Ermoloff , Colonel Samoiloff, 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Russia 
at Peking, and Prince Koudaeheff, formerly first secretary 
of the legation of Russia to Japan. These men were desig-
nated as special delegates. 
(21) Ibid., P• 817. Those accompanying BaYo.n t i ra: 
R~ w. Dennison, legal adviser to the t ~eign 'of- ice; 
Aima.ro Sa.to, minister resident; Yenjiro Yamo~.~ d redt9T 
of the poli tioal bureau in the f O • ~ign of'J i "e-;,; ineh~liiro . 
Adachi, first secretary of lega.tfot'l, councelo i1;_1 th_ , .-"f:or ... ign 
office; Colonel Tachibana, mili.~a~ .a{t~ctfe,_ ~ '. the "-.ra;pan'e's · 
legation in ashington; Kumata.r"O Ro'nda;· secretary in the 
foreign office and private secretary to the minister of 
foreign affairs; Ko taro Konishi, attache of legation. 
( 22) Dennett, .9.12. ill•, P • 23.3. 
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A few days later the Kaiser answered Roosevelt's letter 
telling him how pleased he was with Roosevelt's diplomatic 
action. He said that Germany was interested because the 
Kaiser had every reason to believe that if Roosevelt's 
plan failed that 
ll . Delcasa, had formed a plan by which peace was to 
be made between Russia and Japan through the media-
tion of Franoe and ngland, and that under .it, an 
arrangement was comtemplated by which not only 
Russia and Japan were to obtain portions of China, 
but that France and England were also to be indemni-
fied by Chinese territory as a price of their inter-
vention.23 
The Kaiser felt that England would like to see the 
war go on and be ended in this manner. In conferring 
this messa ge to Tower for the Kaiser, Prince von Bulow 
added that the German Emperor constantly kept in close 
personal correspondence with the Tsar, urging him to 
support Roosevelt's efforts and using the strongest argu-
ments to encourage him to cooperate with the plan. 24 
Von Bula imparted this information in strictest confidence, 
saying that should the fact about this correspondence be 
known the hole country would turn against the Taar, causing 
failure or the plans immediately. 25 
It might be well here to ay that the correspondence 
mentioned was made public by the Bolshevists after the 
Russian Revolution. In one of these ~etters the Tear 
revealed that he had heard about the President's plan from 
( 23) lli.,g_. J P• 234. 
( 24) Ibid., P• 235. 
-
(25) 1.12.l!!. 
e Kaiser betore it w. s ott!eiall presented to him by 
b ssa.dor 'ey r . He went on to eay that he had accepted 
eyer's proposition only after receiving the latter' 
promise or complete secrecy. Then or cour e he could brea.k 
26 off negotiation if the dem nds were too great. 
After ettl!ng the meeting pl ce, announcing the te or 
me ting, and aking public the names or the repreaentat1ves, 
Roo evelt, at the request of the Russian goTernment (made 
June 30, 1905} a.eke Jap n for a.n rmistice. The Japanese 
refu ed for re r that •magnanimity on her part would be mi ... 
interpreted nd turned to b d aocount. against her."27 
The ?re id nt eucceeded in getting a copy or J' pan's 
t rms before the delegate met. At his suggestion the term 
which provided for Vladivostok to be diemantle4 and to be 
made e.saenti lly 0 ercia.l port, an . ror Japan to have 
the right to station consul there, was never presented at 
the conrerenoe. Also a.t hi sugge.st1on different phrase was 
substituted ror the word "inde nity".28 
Roosevelt decided to hold the meeting a.way trom the city 
or ashington beca.-use of the ummer he-a.t there. .Newport 
as considered, but rejected, !or the people there might 
b p rtia.l to th Russians, s embers of the whit.e ce, 
{26) Herman Bernstein, The Willy:-Nicky Correspondence, 
New Yor, 1918, P• 103. 
{27) Dennett, .9R• .£!!•, PP• 399-400 , 
(28 ) ~·, PP• 232 , 244• 
and thus offend the Japanese.29 It was finally decided 
to meet at the Naval Yard at Portsmouth, Ne Hampshire. 
The Portsmouth Naval Yard is on an island in the Pisc~-
taqua river, but within the township of Kittery, Maine. 30 
The plenipotentiaries lived at the Wentworth Hotel at New 
36 
31 Castle, New Hampshire. Portsmouth had in reality nothing 
to do with the peace conference except that the inhabitants 
could see the peace commissioners tw1ce ·a day motoring 
32 through its streets. 
I 
Before the actual meeting of the delegates, Roosevelt 
had several conferences with Baron Kaneko, who was "generally 
recognized as the confidential agent or the Mikado in this 
oountry.n31 The President also had a talk with Baron Rosen 
upon his arrival. 
On Saturday, August 5, 1905, President Roosevelt 
entertained the plenipotentiaries on his yacht, the, Mayflower·. 
The Japanese were brought to the rec ption on the Ta.coma and 
the Russians on her sister ship the Chattanooga. This 
(29) The Memoirs 21.. Count Witte, Tl! nslated_ from the Origi-
nal Russian Manuscripts and Edited by Abra.ham Yarmolinsky, 
Garden City, 1921, P• 147. 
(30) •portsmouth,n The J¥lcyclopaed1a Brit§!!nica, A Dic-
tionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature, and General Inf~rma.tion, 
XXII, 132-33. 
(31) Louis E. van Norman, ttThe Ma.king of a Modern ~reaty of 
Peace," .To!! Amerioan Review .2.f. Reviews, XXXI~ (Oct_ober, .1905) 
P• 420 • 
(32) Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Dipl'omacy~ lie\'f York·, 1924, . 
I, 262. ~ 
(33) -- ''The Progress of the 7orld," ~ American ,fonthly 
Review 2f. Reviews, XXXII (September, 1905). pp. + 59- 61. 
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meeting was a test of Roosevelt's tact and diplomacy. 
The guests were served by Chinese wa1ters;34 supper wa.s 
arranged buffet style with the guests standing, to prevent 
having the touchy problem of seating order. 35 
After the reception the men sailed to ~'ortsmouth, 
the Russians in the May~lower a.nd the Japanese in the 
Dolphin esoort·ed by the cruiser Galveston. 36 
President Roosevelt sent Mr. Herbert D. Pierce, third 
assistant Secretary of State, to Portsmouth to represent 
37 him at the conference. 
The first aeseion of the conference was held at the 
naval building, later called the Peace Building, August 9, 
1905 at ten o'clock. 38 The plenipotentiaries a.greed to 
the use or both English and French. They further a.greed 
that the official treaty would be in French if one were 
made.~9 
Contrary to the custom practiced bef~re this time, 
J apan did not int'orm Russia a.head of the conference the 
exact terms she was going to ask. 40 We know as previously 
{34) .!ill· 
(35) Count Sergius Witte, "Memoirs, My Visit to America 
and the Portsmouth Peace Conference, " The World's Work, 
XLI ( Vi.arch, 1921}, P• 488. - - -
( 36) 
( 37) 
( 38) 
( 39) 
nThe Progress of the World," loc. !?.ll· 
Th!A· 
Ibid. , I>- 264. 
-
~ -
(40) E . J. Dillon, "The Official Narrative of the Peace 
Conference," Harper'.§. rveekly, nrx, pt. 2 ( September 16, 
1905), PP • 1334-37. 
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stated that Roosevelt had seen a copy or Japan's terms. 
On August 10 the .Tapa.nese presented their terms 
according to twelve points: 
( 1) Ruasia, a.ckno l ·edging tha. t .Ta.pan poseesrseA in Korea 
paramount political, military, and economioal 'r nterests, 
to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures 
of guidance, protection, and oontrol which .Tapan finds 
it necessary to take in Korea. 
(2) Engagement on the part of Russia to completely 
evacuate Manchuria within a period to be specified, and 
to relinquish all territorial advantages and all prefer-
ential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that 
region in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or incon-
sistent with the principle of equal opportunity. 
(3) Japan to engage to r~store to China, subject to 
the guarantee of reform and improved administration, 
all those portions of Manchuria which are in her occu-
pation saving only tho regions af°fected by the lease of' 
the Liao-tung Peninsula. 
(4) Japan a.nd Russia reciprocally to engage not to 
obstruot any general measures common to all countries 
which China. may take for the development of' the commerce 
and industries of Manchuria. 
(5) Sakalin and all islands appertaining thereto and 
a.11 public works and properties to be ceded to Japan. 
(6) The lease of Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent 
territory and territorial waters, together with all 
rights, privileges, concessions, and franchises acquired 
by Russia. from China, in connection with or a.s a part 
of such lease and all public works and properties to be 
transferred and ass igned to Japan . 
(7) Russia to assign and transfer to Japan, free of 
all claims and encumbrances, the railway between Harbin 
and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all 
rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto, 
and all coal-mines belonging to or worked for the benefit 
of the railway. 
(8) Ilussia to retain and work the Trans- [anchurian 
Railway, subject to the terms and conditions of the 
concession under which it ie constructed, and subject 
also to the condition that it is to be employed exclu-
sively for commercial and industrial purposes. 
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(9} Russia. to reimburse to Japan the a.ctua.1 expenses 
or the war. The amount as well as the time and manner 
of such reimbursement to be agreed upon. 
(10) All Russian ships of war which, in consequence 
of damage received in battle, sought asylum in neu-
tral ports and were there intern~d, to be surrendered 
to Japan as lawful prizes. 
(11) Russia. to engage to limit her naval strength 
1n the waters of the Extreme =aet. 
(12) Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full 
fishery rights along the coast and in the bays, 
harbors, inlets, and rivera of her Pifaessions in 
the Japan Okhotsk, and ering aeas. 
Two days later, August 12, 1905, the Russian dele-
gates gave their reply to the twelve points. With only 
inor differences the Russians accepted articles one, two, 
three, four, eix, seven, eight, and twelve. They agreed 
in part to rticles ten and eleven, but disagreed alto-
geth~r on points five and nine. Since these to points 
so nearly caused the conference to fail, parts of the 
Russian objections to each are quoted. 42 
Regarding point 5: The ancient rights or Russia 
to the island of Sakhalin already existed at a 
period when Japan did not possess, or, at any r ate, 
did not exercise any right of property over the 
larger part of this island. On the other hand, 
Sakhalin is but the natural continuation of Russian 
possessions in Asia in as much as this island is 
divided from the oon!inent by very shallow straits 
seven versts broad.4 
Regarding point 9: Russia ie unable to consent to 
the stipulation of this clause. None but vanquished 
countries reimburse war costs. And Russia is not 
vanquished.. :Uo country could acknowledge itselt' 
( 41) D.!£. 
( 42) Ibid. 
( 43) 1..l2il. 
vanquished whose territory has scarcely been 
attacked by the enemy.44 
40 
The plenipotentiaries !ina.lly a.greed to record their 
divergence and to pa.as on to the other articles, coming 
back to these after they had dealt with all the others. 45 
On August 18, 1905, Speak von Sternberg wrote Roose-
velt that England and France planned to offer their good 
services to bring the eQnflict to an end ir the conference 
should fail. Sternberg said that it was · believed in 
Germany that France and England were "not waiting tor 
the dissolution of the conference," but would "take ad-
vantage or the ~irst hitch so as to place themselves in 
your [!loosevel t' ~position. "46 
It was on August 18, 1905 that the delegate& again 
directed their attention to the disputed points. They 
could not agree and the conference seemed to be deadlocked; 
howeTer, Witte and Komura had had a personal conference 
at which a oompromi·se wa.s oonsidered. 47 It is a dis-
putable point as to which offered the compromise. 
Komura told Kaneko to ask Roosevelt not to intervene49 
but his request came too late as the President had already, 
{ 44) .il?.1S. 
{45) ~ -
(46) Dennett, .Ql!• £.Lt•, p. 266. 
( 47) "The Progress of' the World," .211• ill·, P• 264. 
(48) Dennett, .Q.;Q• .Qi!•, PP • 250-51. 
{49) lJll..g., PP• 250-51 . 
e,-::t.rly cn1 August 19 s 1905, su:r:1mo:ned 13a.ron Rocr3en to 
ro Oyster :Bay .. u Roose,,elt asked R<Jsen to send .@, compromise 
, . ·. '°' - 51 plan to the ..c s1;1r .. 
him .,io see the Tzar and deliver &, 
up point.s ten and eleven for the limitation of J1ussia..n 
naVCJ,l power in the Pacific and for possession of the 
Russian interried ships in neutral ports. He thought 
they uhould h~,ve given in on these two :points but he 
i'ound that the 
Japanese are •;villing to restore the northern half' 
of S;Jd1i~lin to RusEiD.t Russi,a. of courze, in :,;uoh 
case to pay a substantial su:m for the surrender of 
tlH~ !:~ri t?ry hy tg.~ .Ttl,paneee and for the return of 
Rus.s1,,;1,n :pr1.so:ners ... 
The President sr:1 .. id he thought it, would be a eala ..mi ty 
to continue the weir if peti,ce could be hzi.d on such just 
and honorable tru·ms.. If an agreement could be made on 
these two points then.the amount could be a subject for 
negotiatio11w Roosevelt thought it would l1e a financial 
to be driven out of her }~astern Siberian provinces. '1'11.e 
only ch~nge of territory if pe.aoe were m.ade now wcnald be 
that Japan would get tha.t :part ot' Sakhalin which was 
42 
he:rs thirty years before.. Hoosev,elt had 11eye:r point 
this modification mo.de by Jrqn:1,n on pointa five and nine 
and making peace at thi11, t time. 5 3 
.'.mg,'Us't 2;~t 1905, President Roosevelt wrote Kentaro 
1:aneko, ;;1, Harvard law gra.d.ua te who wa.s an unoff ieial 
54 . . . delegate to ·the peace ·conference, ,explaining that 
he hn.d heard much complaint over the :prosp.ects ot' Ja:pan 
continuing the WLir for a large money indemnity. He 
s;;;:.id that Amcrici:o>.n sentiment would turn against Japan 
1.:u1der such terms. Roosevelt st1ggested ·that if Japan 
""';~s wilLing to retrocede the northern ho.lf of Se.khri.lin, 
surely she eould malrn enough t:J repay her in part.. He 
collect any a.mount that Russia ,7ould p!iy but that i'f 
she refused. he thought there would be nothing gained by 
continuin.e the w2~r exeept bloodshed and erpense.. He 
said this letter was .ztrictly confidential but he would 
55 lH::e for Kaneko to cable it to his home office at once" · 
On thio sa.m<1; day the '.'rea1"' sent Witte the following 
the negotiations arc being broken off because or 
t11e intractability of' the Japanese as regards the 
to3) Ibid ----- . -----•-e••-••--<l --
{ 54) 1.Iel ville • Stone, J?ii.'..:!;.l: Years f! Journalist, 
London, 1922, P• 286. 
question of indemnity; we must stop then and 
there ,56 
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In a supplementary letter written to Kaneko the 
following day, August 23, 1905, Roosevelt said the Japa-
nese should m ke peace "!or two reasons: l, self-
interest, 2, the interest ot the world, to which she owes 
a certain duty. 057 Roosevelt then orfered two sets of 
reasons for making peace even without getting a money 
indemnity: 
(1) It is Japan's interest now to close the war. 
She has won the control of Korea and •anahuria, 
she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that 
of Russia, she has Port Arthur, Da.lney, the an-
churia.n railroad, she has Sakhalin. It is not 
worth her while to continue; it would probably 
eat up more money than she could at the e1,d get 
back from Russia, She will be wise nowt& close 
the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a 
leading memoer at the council table 01 the nations. 
(2) Ethically it seems to me that Japan o es a 
duty to the world a.t this crisis. The eivil1ze.d 
world looks to her to make peace 1 the nations 
believe in her, let her show her leadership in 
matters ethical no less than matters military. 
The appeal is made to her in the name or all 
that is lofty and noble, and to this appeal I 
hope she wi11 not be dear.58 
According to a letter, Meyer to Roosevelt, August 23, 
1905, the Tsar received Meyer at four o'clock in the 
afternoon, for an interview or two hours. At the end 
or the talk, the Tsar said he would make peace 1! he 
(56} 
(57) 
Cecil 
(58) 
1.B!.9.. 
Stephen Gwynn, 1h!, Letters~ Friendships .2f.. 
Spring~' Cambridge, 1929, II, 488-89. 
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believed it to be honorable and lasting. but he would 
not pay a war indemnity. He agreed to pay a generous 
amount for the care and maintenance of the Russian 
prisoners but not such a. sum as could be interpreted as 
a war indemnity. He would agree for Japan to retain 
the southern half of Sakhalin island with Russia retain-
ing the northern half. He insisted that Japan give up 
her claim !or the interned ships and limitation of naval 
power in the Pacific. The Emperor expressed his thanks 
for the President's efforts 1n behalf of pea..ce. 59 
In a letter written on August 25, 1905, Meyer 
explained more thoroughly hie interview with the Tsar. 
He said that Roosevelt 's original instruetions reached 
him first at 8 a. m. August 22. Only: a pa.rt of the 
message was delivered. Meyer said he thought the . remain~ 
der of the message was held up purposely, and that he 
was sure the Russian officials had read the message, 
b~eause they had the American code.60 The fact that the 
Emperor knew wl\ere to turn in Meyer's translation of the 
message ·to find the phrase "substantial sum" 1ta.s evidence 
,, ,i .•• 
that he had a. knowledfe or the contents of the code 
mes8age. Meyer believed that the Emperor and other 
important officials had held a conference until late 
the previous night at Peterhor. 61 During the interview 
159) Dennett, .sm• ~., PP• 270-71. 
(60) M. A . De Wolfe Howe, George !.Q.ll Lengerke 1!eYer His 
Life 3nd Public Services, New York, 1920, pp. 197-98. 
(61) ~-
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the Emperor read Meyer a part of a telegram he had 
sent to the Kaiser that morning, saying that "much as he 
wanted peace it must be an honorable one for Russia and 
therefore he could not give up Russian territory or pay 
a war indemnity in any form.«62 
Meyer presented his argument in favor or these 
concessions on the part of' the Tear but it was evident 
that the Tsar had made promises to his government offi-
cials not to concede anything. Meyer said he believed 
that the Emperor would have favored RooaeTelt's sugges-
tions if the ministers and influential men had not seen 
him first, after they had intercepted Roosevelt's 
messa.ge. 63 
Arter t he two hour interview the Tsar informed 
eyer of the terms upon which he would make peace. 
Acceptance of the eight points substantially agreed 
upon by the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth, no 
payment or war indemnity but a liberal and generous 
payment !or ca.re and maintenance of Ruasia.n prisoners 
but not such a sum a.s could be interpreted for a war 
indemnity, withdrawal of Japan's claims for interned 
ships and limitations of naval power in the Pacific, 
Russ ia. to possess north ha.lr6ir Sakhalin while Japan 
was to retain southern half. 
After the President received Meyer 's cable stating 
the results of his interview with Tsar Nicholas, he sent 
(62) Ibid. It was a.t this interview tha.t the Emperor 
remarked"that it was quite a coincidence that each time 
I ~eye.i) came to see the Emperor he had a telegram from 
the German Empe_ror ( in their private eode) urging him 
to make peace." This really was not a coincidence since 
Roosevelt was having the Kaiser exert his influence on 
ea.ch occasion. 
( 63) 1l!.!,g. 
(64) Ibid. 
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:Meyer a.nothe;r cable·, asking him to m&ke it elea.r to 
the Tsar that if he a.ecepted Roosevelt's terms then the 
whole question a.e to wha.t a. "reasonable a.mount to be 
paid for the retrocessio·n of no.rthern Sakhalin and the 
return ot the Russian pris·o,ners" would remain a. subject 
for further negotiation .. 65 Roos.evel t sa.14 that he was 
not sure that Japan would aeoept these terms but that 
h e thought they should and that he would try to get 
t 66 them o agree. 
Meyer ,answered the Pres1.dent Auguat 24, .stating 
that he had i"orw:arded the President'' .s last message to 
the Tsar. Meyer did not, know tha. t Roo$-evel t had. reeei ved 
his letter of August 23 before sending his second cable 
of instructions. He opined that the Tsar would eons-ent 
to pay land value for th.e north hale of Sakhalin. 67 
This bit of encouragement caused Roosevelt to ca..ble 
:M,eyer August 25, 1905, more instruetione. Yr. Rooaevelt 
told Mey.er to tell the Tsar tha.t he did not want to force 
h is a.dvi_ce upon him but "f'or tear or misa.ppr ·ehension I 
venture a.gain to have these $ta.tements ma.de to him," and 
goes ~n to show tha.t an ex tension o! war will inTolve 
Russia in a. great calamity, and that since Sakhalin wa.s 
[65}' Denn~tt, ~· git., p. 267. 
(66) Ibid. In Bishop, .!l?• cit., p. 410, Witte told 
Takahira. that the Empero.r upon receipt o·f Roosevel t ·•s 
second message through Meyer wrote on the letter "'no 
further considerat ion" a.n:d put it a.side. 
( 67 Dei:i_ne_tt, 2J2• . ci t . p . 2 71 . 
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in the hands of the .Japanese they would not be giving 
anything for peace because if the war continued .Japan 
would surely take more than that much territory. Roose-
velt said that peace ntade on tha terms he had previou ly 
suggested would leave Russia substantially unharmed and 
her national honor would be savea. 68 
On Augu t 26, 1905, the Mikado sent his reply to 
the appeal made by Roosevelt through Kaneko on August 
22 in regard to peace terms. He expressed his thanks 
ror Roosevelt's efforts and wrote 
The Imperial Government will have no hesitation 
in acting on the advice, and they will accordingly, 
in the matter or the amount of compensation, con-
sent to make .still further concessions. 6 9 
Melville E . Stone, a journalist, said that the 
conference was a.gain deadlocked on Friday, August 25, 1905.70 
However, Bi sh~p says 
The promised "conceaaions 0 [§.s explained in previous 
paragrap!i}did not apparently reach the Japanese 
envoya on August 27, 1905, ,or if received were not 
satisfactory to the Russians, tor on that day the 
.Tap neae envoys abandoned all hope of peace.71 
' 
Upon advice from the Tsar, Witte had informed the 
.Japanese plenipotentiaries that the conference oul~ 
come to a elose; however, Witte agreed to a final meeting 
on Monday afternoon. 72 Later the final meeting wa. 
"(68) 
(69) 
·\,es, 
""'"1' \ 
e_a)9 Y 
Bernstein,~.2.Jl· .21!•, pp. 329- 332. 
Bishop, .Q.12• oi t., PP• 408-09. 
(70) Stone, ..2:Q• .21!•, p. 286. 
(71) Bishop, ..2.R• £1.1.•, p. 409. 
(72) Ibid. 
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postponed until Tuesday .. ?'l> 
On Sunday, August 27, 1905, Baron Kaneko recei'-re<! 
permission to s,e-e Melvin E. Stone o,n a.n important matter. 
Kaneko said that he thought Witte and Rose·n were bluff:• 
1ng but Stone disagreed and expressed the opinion tha.t 
. . i 74 Russia. would. not pay a eent of indemn ty. Kaneko 
then said that even if they waived that point the eon-
ferenee would end anyway because Witte a.nd Rosen we.re 
not aympa. the tie with it .. ?f> Stone ea.id there was but one 
ma.n who could sa.ve the situation and that was the Emperor 
o! Germa.ny. 76 
Kaneko and Stone then agreed. upon what course to 
take. Baron von dem Bussohe-Ha.d(ienha:uaen, counsellor 
and f'irst •eoretary of the German. Embassy who was in 
charge eince Ambassador von Sternbe:E'.g wa..s ttot in America, 
and President Roosevelt were e,onfer.red with . Stone 
suggested tha. t Roosevelt writ,e a mes.sage to the Kaiser con-
cerning the sltua tion .. 77 
Roosevelt then sent the German Emperor a. message, 
August 27, .1905, as follows: 
(75) 
(7·4) 
( 75) 
(76) 
(77) 
.Pea.ee can be obtained on the following ter:ms.: 
Russia to pay no i .ndeml'lity what~ver and to receive 
back the north half' ot Sakhalin, ror which it is to 
pay Japan whatever a.lnount a mixed commission ma.y 
ill.!!·, P• 410. 
Stone, op. ill•, P• 2S7. 
Ibid., P• 288. 
-
Ibid. 
-
Ibid., P• 289. 
determine. This is my proposition to which 
the Japanese have assent~d reluctantly and 
0 nly under strong pressure from me.78 
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Roosevelt explained the plan for selecting a commission 
t-0 make final settlement on this point. Roosevelt told 
the Kaiser tha. t he considered these terms moderate. He 
asked the Kaiser if he would not present these terms to 
the Tsar as he knew the Kaiser would ha.ve more influence 
upon the Tsar than anyone else. Roosevelt asked the 
Kaiser to present the plan immedia.t.ely " • • • 1r in your 
~he Kaiser '~wisdom you aee fit to make it ... 79 
Roosevelt also sent a copy of this letter to the 
Mika.do. 80 While Buasche was putting the President•s 
message into code, Stone happened to think that Kaneko 
was only an unott icie.l commissione·r to the conference 
and might not speak with authority. Stone tried to 
phone Komura. but was unable to reach him because a. 
storm had destroyed phone connections. Bussche sent the 
message to the Kaiser with an explanation of the cir-
cumstances. In an exchange of wires with another corre-
spondent at Portsmouth, Stone learned that Ta.kahira 
denied that Kaneko was in any way authorized to speak 
for the commission.81 
{78) Ibid., p. 289. On page 290 Stone explains that 
this last sentence was added "after deliberation, as 
a diplomatic phrase to avoid saying that the offer came 
from the Japanese . " 
(79) ~-
(80) Bishop, ..Q.12 • .2.ll•, P• 411 . 
(81) Stone, .QJ2• .2.i.1•, PP• 290-91. 
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On the same day, uguat 27, 1905, Witte wrote the 
Foreign Minister to tell him that he had postpone the 
end of the conference until Tuesday, due to the fourteen 
hours difference in time between the United States and 
Russia. The Emperor wrote the following remark on the 
margin or this dispatch when he received it: 
Send Witte my order to end the parley tomorro 
in any event. I prefer to continue the war, 
rather than to wait for gracious concessions 
on the part or Japan. Dated Peterho!, August 28, 
1905.82 
Roosevelt sent Bron Komura a letter August 28, 
explaining that he had had several interviews with 
Baron Kaneko and had assumed that he as acting at Komu-
ra's request. Roosevelt said that Kaneko had shown him 
seTeral telegrams apparently prepared by Komura for that 
purpose. Roosevelt explained. about the letter that had 
been sent to the Kaiser, about Taka.hira's denial of 
Kaneko's authority, and that he would retract his cable 
and not communicate with Kaneko unless Komura assured him 
of T neko's authority. 83 
The President and Stone then decided to publish 
.Japan' illingness (1) to waive their claims for a '\Var 
indemnity and (2) to eede back to Russia the northern 
pa.rt of Sakhalin at a price to be fixe by a mixed eom-
84 
mission, thus to eeal the Japanese pledge. 
(82) ,!rut Memoirs of Count Witte, .2.12• cit., P• 158. 
(83) Stone,~· ill•, PP• 291- 92. 
(84) Howe, .212• ..Ql!•, pp. 203-05. 
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Success for Roosevelt's last appeal to the ika.do 
ea.me August 29, 1905. The Japanese envoys gave him the 
Mikado's answer: 
The Emperor, after presiding a.ta Cabinet Council, 
decided to withdraw the demand of a money payment 
for the cost of war entirely, if Russia recognizes 
the occupation of Saghalien Island by Japan, because 
the Emperor regards h'.umanity ang5civil1sa.tion far 
more than his na.tionts welfare. 
On Tuesday, August 29, 1905, Komura. assured Roosevelt 
that Kaneko wa.a a responsible plenipotentiary and that they 
had made no mistake in receiving him and dealing with him. 86 
Before the opening of what seemed would be the final 
session of Tuesday, Komura had a private conversation 
with Wi-tte. Witte assured Komura that this would be the 
end ot the conrerenee as he ha.d instructions to break orr 
today if the Japanese did not agree to the Emperor's 
decision.87 Witte left this interview, so certain or 
success that he sent a message to the Foreign Minister 
expressing that idea.88 
What had been planned as the last meeting of the 
conrerence89 turned out to be the end of the controver-
sial points. The Japanese plenipotentiaries withdrew 
(85} Biehop, .Q.£• ill•, PP• 411-12. 
(86) Stone, .Q.J2.• .£11•, p. 295. 
(87) The Memoirs of Count Witte, .Q.12.• £ii· • pp. 158- 59. 
( 8 8 ) 1.12.1.9. • 
(89) Stone, .21!.· cit., PP• 295-96. Witte had planned to 
give a signal, which meant continuation of the war, if the 
Japanese had still insisted on an indemnity. 
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their cl ims as previously agreed to by the Mikado to 
Roose-vel t. 
The treaty in its final form was written by to 
international law experts, Professor The-0dore Martens 
!or Russia and Mr . Henry w. Dennison, an American, for 
.Japan. 90 The treaty as prepared wa.-s formally signed by 
the plenipotentiaries at 3:50 p.m. in the Portsmouth Naval 
Yard Building where the essions had been held, August 29, 
1905.91 A copy of the treaty will be found in the appendix. 
On October 14, 1905, the treaty as signed by both 
the .Japanese and Russian Emperors. 92 
President Roosevelt received letters of thanks for 
hi efforts in regard to peace and tor his triendehip 
93 from both perors. 
As a fitting climax to his efforts President Roose-
velt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He kept the 
medal and diploma. but turned the prize check for $36, 734.79 
over to a. committee of United States citizens for trust 
to be used as a 'founda tion !or promoting the ca.use or 
industrial peace in this country @ni ted State~. n94 
(90) Van Norman, lQ.Q_.,_sU., p. 421. 
(91) Rosen, Forty Yea.rs .QI.. Diplomacy• Uew York, 1922 , 
I, 272. 
(92) Foreign Relations 1905, p. 820- 22. 
(93) 11?..!Q., P• 823. 
(94) Bishop, .Q:Q• cit., p. 422. 
APPENDIX I 
TREATY OF PEACE 
Russia and Japan, September 5, 1905 
i 
This copy or the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 is found in 
John v. A. llacMurray, Treaties and Agreements V/ith And Q.Q.n.-
cerning China 1894-1919 (:New Yo.rk, 1921) I, 522-525. 
His Majesty the J1'mperor of Japan on t he one part, and 
His Majesty the Emperor of the Russias on the other part, 
animated by the desire to reatore the blessings of' peace to 
Their countries and peoples, have resolved to conclude a 
Treaty of Peace, and have, for t hia purpose, named Their 
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 
His Majesty the Emperor or Japan, 
His Excellency Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusammi, Grand 
Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, His Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, and 
His Excellency M. Taka.hira Kogoro, Jusammi, Grand Cordon 
or the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United 
States of America; 
And His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russia.a: 
His Excellency M. Serge Witte, His Secretary of State 
and President of the Committee of Ministers of' the Empire of 
Russia, and 
Hi s Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial 
Court of Russia ana His Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary to the United States of America; 
Who, after having exchangea their full powers which were 
round to be in good and due form, have concluded the follow-
ing Articles: 
ARTICLE I. There shall henceforth be peace and amity 
between Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor 
of all the Russias and between Their respective States a.nd 
subjects. 
ARTICLE II. The Imperial Russian Government, acknow-
ledging tha t Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, 
military and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct 
nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and 
control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it 
necessary to t ake in Corea. 
ii 
It is understood that Russian subjects in Corea shall 
be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or 
citizens of other foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall 
be placed on the same footing as the sub.jects or ei tizens 
or the most favoured nation. 
It is also agreed that, in order to a.void all cause of 
misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will 
abstain, on the Russo-Corean trontier, rrom taking any mili-
tary measure which may menace the security of Russian or 
Corean territory. 
ARTICLE III. Japan and Russia mutually engage: 
1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria. 
except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung 
Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional 
Article I annexed to this Treaty; and 
2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive 
administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the 
occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian 
troops, with the exception o:r the territory above mentioned. 
The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they 
have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or prefer-
ential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese 
sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal 
opportunity. 
ARTICLE IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not 
to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, 
which China may take for the development of the commerce and 
industry of Manchuria. 
ARTICLE v. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and 
assign to the Imperial Government or Japan, with the consent 
of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta.lien 
and adjacent territory and territorial. waters and a.11 rights, 
privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of 
such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial 
Government or Japan all public works and properties in the 
territory affected by the above mentioned lease. 
The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to 
obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in 
the foregoing stipulation. 
The Imperial Government of Japan on their part under-
take that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the 
territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected. 
ARTICLE VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to 
transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, 
without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese 
Government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kuancheng-tzu) 
iii 
and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, 
privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, 
as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or 
worked for the benefit of the railway. 
The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain 
the consent or the Govermnent of China mentioned in the fore-
going stipulation. 
ARTICLE VII. Japan and Russia engage to exploit their 
respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial 
and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes. 
It is understood that that restriction does not apply to 
the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-
tung Peninsula. 
ARTICLE VIII. The Imperial Governments of Japan a.nd 
Russia, with a view to promote and facilitate intercourse and 
traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude a separate ·Con-
vention for tlle)regula.tion of their connecting railway services 
in lia.nchuria.ll 
ARTICLE DC. The Imperial Russian Government cede to the 
Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, 
the southern portion or the Island of Saghalien and all islands 
adjacent thereto, and all public works and properties thereon. 
The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the north-
ern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment or 
such territory shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of additional Article II annexed to this Treaty. 
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their 
respective possessions on the Island of Saghalien or the 
adjacent islands, any f'orti!ications or other similar military 
works. They also respectively engage not to take any military 
measures which may impede the free navigation of the Straits 
of La. Perouse and Tartary. 
ARTICLE x. It is reserved to the Russian subjects 
inhabitants or the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their 
real property and retire to their country; but, if they prefer 
to remain in the ceded territory, they will be maintained and 
protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights 
of property, on condition of submitting to Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the 
right of residence in, or to deport from, euah territory, any 
inhabitants who labour under political or administrative 
disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights 
or such inhabitants shall be fully respected. 
(1) Such a convention was concluded June 13, 1907. 
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ARTICLE XI.(2) Russia engages to arrange with Japan 
for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along 
the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk 
and Behring Seas. 
It is agreed tha.t the foregoing engagement shall not 
affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects 
in those regions. 
ARTICLE XII.( 3) The Treaty or Commerce and Navigation 
between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war, the 
Imperial Governments or Japan and Russia engage to adopt as 
the basis of their commercial relations, pending the conclu-
sion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation on the basis 
of the Treaty which was in force previous to the present war, 
the system or reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most 
favoured nation, in which are included import and export 
duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, and 
the admission and treatment of the agents, subjects and vessels 
of one country in the territories of the other. 
ARTICLE XIII. As soon as possible after the present 
Treaty comes into force, all prisoners of war shall be reci-
procally restored. The Imperial Government of Japan and Russia 
shall each appoint a special Commissioner to take charge or 
prisoners. All prisoners i.ri the hands of' one Government shall 
be delivered to and received by the Commissioner of the other 
Government or by his duly authorized representative, in such 
convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the deliver-
ing State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to 
the Commissioner of the receiving State. 
The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present to 
each other, as soon as possible after the delivery of prisoners 
has been completed, a statement of the direct expenditures 
respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance 
or prisoners from the date of' capture or surrender up to the 
time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay to Japan, 
as soon as possible af'ter the exchange of the statements as 
above provided, the difference between the actual a.mount so 
expended by Japan and the actual a.mount similarly disbursed by 
Russia. 
ARTICLE XIV. The present Treaty shall be ratified by 
Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all 
(2) A fisheries convention was concluded between Japan and 
Russia on July 28, 190?. 
(3) A treaty of commerce and navigation with separate articles, 
protocols and exchange of notes attached thereto, and a pro-
tocol relating to certain Japanese and Russian consulates, 
were concluded between Japan and Russia on July 28, 1907. 
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the Russia.s. Such ratification shall , with as little delay 
as possible and in any case not later than fifty days from 
the date of the signature of the Treaty, be announced to the 
Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through 
the French Minister in Tokio and the Ambassador of the United 
States in Saint Petersburg and from the date of the later or 
such announcements this Treaty shall in all its parts come 
into full force. 
The formal exchange or the ratifications shall take place 
at Washington as soon as possible.l4J 
ARTICLE xv. The present Treaty shall be signed in 
duplioate in both the English and French languages. The texts 
are in absolute conformity, but in case of discrepancy in 
interpretation, the French text shall prevail. 
In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries 
have signed and affixed their seals to the present Treaty of 
Peace. 
Done at(New Hampshire) Portsmouth thie fifth day the 
ninth month o! the thirty-eighth year of Meiji , corres:pond-
ing to the twenty-third day of August (fifth September) one 
thousand nine hundred and five. 
(Signed) J utaro Komura [!,. sJ (Signed) Serge Witte {L. sJ 
(Signed) K. Taka.hira [!.. s1 (Signed) Rosen ( L. sJ 
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES 
In conformity with the provisions of Articles III and 
IX of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia of this 
date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the 
following additional articles: 
I To Article III 
The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually 
engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces 
from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately 
after the Treaty of' Peace comes into operation, and within a 
period of eighteen months from that date, the Armies of the 
two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, 
except from the leased territory of the Liao-tung Peninsula. 
The forces of the two countries occupying the front 
positions shall be first withdrawn . 
(4) Ratifications were exchanged at w"a:shington, November 25, 
1905. 
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The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the 
right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway 
lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not 
exceed fif'teen per kilometre a.nd within that maximum number, 
the Commanders of the J apanese and Russian Armies shall, by 
common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed, 
as small as possible having in view the actual requirements. 
The Commanders of the J apanese and Russian forces in Man-
churia shall agree upon the details of the evacu tion in con-
formity with the above principles, and shall take by common 
accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as 
soon as possible and in any case not later than the period of 
eighteen months. 
II To Article IX 
As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into 
force, a Commission of Delimi tat.ion, composed of a.n equal 
number of members to be appointed respectively by the two 
High Contracting Parties, shall on the spot, mark in a per-
manent manner the exa ct boundary between the Japanese and 
Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalien. The Com-
mission hall be bound, so far as topographical considerations 
permit, to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude 
a.a the boundary line, and in case any eflections from that 
line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation 
ill be ma ae by correlative cteflections at other points . It 
shall also be the duty or the said Commission to prepare a 
list and description of the adjacent islands included in the 
cessions a.nd finally the Commission shall prepare and sign 
maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work 
of the Commi ssion shal l be subject to the approval or the 
High Contracting Parties. 
The foregoing Additional Articles are to be considered 
as r a tified with the ratification of the Treaty or Peace to 
which they are annexed . 
Portsmouth, the 5th day, 9th month, 38th year or 
Meiji, corresponding the 23rd August (September 5th), 1905. 
(Signed) Jutaro Komura. 
(Signed) K . 'l'akahira · 
(Signed) Serge Witte 
(Signed) Rosen 
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APPENDIX II 
PROTOCOL OF ARMISTICE BETWEEli JAPAN AND RUSSIA 
September 1, 1905 
"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of Japan and Russia. 
duly authorized to that effect by their Governments have 
agreed upon the following terms of armistiee between the 
belligerents, pending the coming into f'orce .of the Treaty of 
Peace: 
"l . A certain distance (zone of demarcation) shall be 
fixed between the fronts of the armies or the two Powers in 
Manchuria as well as in the region of the Tomamko (Tumen). 
11 2. The naval forces of one of the belligerents shall 
not bombard territory belonging to or occupied by the other . 
ttJ. Maritime captures wil l not be suspended by the Armistice. 
"4. During the term of the armistice reinforcements 
shall not be dispatched to the theatre of war. Those which 
are enroute shall not be dispatched to the north of Mukden 
on the part o! Japan and to the south of Harbin on the part 
of Russia. 
"5. The commanders of the armies and fleets of the two 
Powers shall determine in common accord the conditions of the 
armistice in conformity with the provisions above enumerated. 
"6. The two Governments shall give orders to their 
commanders immediately after the signature of the Treaty or 
Peace in order to put this protocol in execution. 
"Portsmouth, 1st September, 1905 . 
" (Signed) Jutaro Komura 
"K. Takahira 
"Serge Witte 
"Rosen" 
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